HANS MORGENTHAU AND THE IRAQ WAR REALISM VERSUS NEO-CONSERVATISM PDF

In contrast to disciplines pertaining to the hard sciences and much of its brethren within the social sciences, scholars within the field of international relations struggle to endorse and subsequently implement policy that adequately alleviates potential security threats in the international system. Of course, the dynamic nature of the international community does not facilitate this process, but nevertheless, if a discipline is to be evaluated based upon its ability to foresee future actions based upon generalizable events of the past, the field of international relations has a rather subpar track record of preventing substantial outbreaks of conflict in a non-reactionary manner. Prior to discrediting a strictly realist understanding of contemporary world politics when examining the Iraq War, one must provide the arguments that realists raise. One such argument is that Saddam Hussein—whether it is demonstrated in his invasion and looting of sovereign Kuwait in order to compensate for mass debt following the Iraq-Iran War or in his eventual withdrawal during the Gulf War after realizing his forces were wildly outmatched—never deviated from being a rational actor. These premises are inconclusive from a number of vantage points—the first of which being that an invasion of Kuwait would not abide by realist balance of power principles.

Author:Kelkree Zuzilkree
Country:Belgium
Language:English (Spanish)
Genre:Automotive
Published (Last):18 September 2011
Pages:360
PDF File Size:14.41 Mb
ePub File Size:9.42 Mb
ISBN:954-5-68996-509-2
Downloads:5904
Price:Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]
Uploader:Gushura



In contrast to disciplines pertaining to the hard sciences and much of its brethren within the social sciences, scholars within the field of international relations struggle to endorse and subsequently implement policy that adequately alleviates potential security threats in the international system.

Of course, the dynamic nature of the international community does not facilitate this process, but nevertheless, if a discipline is to be evaluated based upon its ability to foresee future actions based upon generalizable events of the past, the field of international relations has a rather subpar track record of preventing substantial outbreaks of conflict in a non-reactionary manner.

Prior to discrediting a strictly realist understanding of contemporary world politics when examining the Iraq War, one must provide the arguments that realists raise. One such argument is that Saddam Hussein—whether it is demonstrated in his invasion and looting of sovereign Kuwait in order to compensate for mass debt following the Iraq-Iran War or in his eventual withdrawal during the Gulf War after realizing his forces were wildly outmatched—never deviated from being a rational actor.

These premises are inconclusive from a number of vantage points—the first of which being that an invasion of Kuwait would not abide by realist balance of power principles. Iraq invaded Kuwait without securing U. Prior to even examining the ideological and sectarian influences encapsulating the region at the time, the aforementioned realist argument appears flawed. However, a second realist argument simply asserts that, in realist terms, the U.

The irony here is that the realist overlooks the very reason why liberation does not work, at least swiftly, in traditionally undemocratic regions: the peculiarities—structure, identity, domestic and foreign objectives—that vary by state.

For surely, if every state was internally identical, widespread instantaneous democratization would be even simpler than Fukuyama envisioned. Hence, realism may have been able to accurately predict the limitations of the paradoxical dichotomy that is neoconservatism, but a reluctance to acknowledge the monumental effects of the substate, let alone the suprastate as well, makes it unrealistic in contemporary world politics whilst standing alone.

Since realism does not adequately account for the vastly distinctive characteristics of respective states that hinder the prospect of accelerated change, perhaps alternative theories can explain the nature of the Iraq War. And based upon the aforementioned flaw of realism, liberalism and its prioritization of non-state institutions may be better equipped. In other words, the prospect of Wilsonian idealism prompted the U. The Bush administration bypassed and spied on the UN, and additionally, liberalism fails to explain why the U.

Ultimately, the very mechanisms that liberals expect to prevent unjust wars—the internal and external constraints of peace-desiring institutions and subjects—simply did not provide significant resistance.

Alas, if U. In this view, trans-state ideological partnership—between the U. Such empirical evidence surely reasserts that solely realism is not realistic, but furthermore, that any strict theory would omit vital factors to the explanations of the functioning of the Iraq War and the international community as a whole.

Thus far the Iraq War has seemingly revealed how particular mainstream theories fail to explain cause and effect in the international system; in short, ideological and psychological factors attributed to decision-making are incompatible with realism, and liberal theory loses legitimacy insofar that an unprovoked democracy attacked a non-democracy—leaving the supposed savior-like democracy responsible for mass civilian suffering.

At this juncture, international relations theorists may feel helpless; for if individual elites who continuously fall in and out of power are responsible for foreign initiatives, generalizability is practically impossible. Henceforth, the intention will be to emphasize generalizable theoretical lessons that were learned or reinforced during the Iraq War. One such lesson is that in the absence of a clear and imminent threat, leaders may go to war because they perceive a low-cost, low-risk opportunity to make partisan political gains Lieberfeld The Iraq War of course eventually blossomed into a high-cost, high-risk war for the U.

Under the circumstances, sovereignty becomes conditional, and conditional sovereignty is obviously incompatible with realist and liberal ideology. Hinnebusch goes on to conclude that U. And in the absence of bipolarity, a lack of formidable domestic and international constraints allows the hegemon to police the world as it pleases.

Fukuyama, F. Hinnebusch, R. Ikenberry, J. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Jervis, R. Kaldor, M. Krasner, S. LaFeber, W. Lieberfeld, D. Mayer, J. Mearsheimer, J. Pieterse, J. Soderblom, J.

HP 3456A MANUAL PDF

HANS MORGENTHAU AND THE IRAQ WAR REALISM VERSUS NEO-CONSERVATISM PDF

Morgenthau made landmark contributions to international relations theory and the study of international law. His Politics Among Nations, first published in , went through five editions during his lifetime. Morgenthau also wrote widely about international politics and U. He knew and corresponded with many of the leading intellectuals and writers of his era, such as Reinhold Niebuhr,[1] George F. Kennan,[2] Carl Schmitt [3] and Hannah Arendt. Department of State when Kennan headed its Policy Planning Staff, and a second time during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations until he was dismissed by Johnson when he began to publicly criticize American policy in Vietnam.

BOBRICK B-2111 PDF

Hans Morgenthau

Home Essays Recension to John The content of the article is kind of specific: it represents to readers a comparative analysis of these two directions of political thought. Hans Morgenthau was one of the most influential American thinkers of the 20th century. He is considered as one of the greatest representatives of realism in the United States and as the founder of the American political realism. To understand the main ideas and principles of realism and neo-conservatism the author defined the positions of these two conceptions in particular historic situations — the Vietnam war and Iraq war. Considering the parallel between these two conflicts with regard to the fact that realists except for Kissinger opposed the war in Vietnam, the author concluded that realists, including Morgenthau, would take the same position in case of Iraq. At first Mearsheimer describes the basic ideas.

Related Articles